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National blood donor screening for West Nile virus
(WNV) RNA using minipool nucleic acid amplification test-
ing (MP-NAT) was implemented in the United States in July
2003. We compiled national NAT yield data and performed
WNV immunoglobulin M (IgM) testing in 1 WNV-epidemic
region (North Dakota). State-specific MP-NAT yield, anti-
body seroprevalence, and the average time RNA is
detectable by MP-NAT were used to estimate incident
infections in 2003. WNV donor screening yielded 944 con-
firmed viremic donors. MP-NAT yield peaked in August with
>0.5% of donations positive for WNV RNAin 4 states. Peak
IgM seroprevalence for North Dakota was 5.2% in late
September. The average time viremia is detectable by MP-
NAT was 6.9 days (95% confidence interval [CI] 3.0–10.7).
An estimated 735,000 (95% CI 322,000–1,147,000) infec-
tions occurred in 2003, with 256 (95% CI 112–401) infec-
tions per neuroinvasive case. In addition to preventing
transfusion-transmitted WNV infection, donor screening
can serve as a tool to monitor seasonal incidence in the
general population.
A
fter its identification in New York City in 1999, West
Nile virus (WNV), a mosquitoborne flavivirus,
emerged as a cause of neuroinvasive disease (meningitis,
encephalitis, and acute flaccid paralysis) and febrile illness
in the United States (1–5). Since 2000, a national surveil-
lance system, ArboNET, has monitored WNV activity in
mosquitoes, horses, and other animals, as well as cases of
febrile illness and neuroinvasive disease in humans (2).
Seroprevalence studies after epidemics indicate that febrile
illness develops in ≈20% of infected persons, while neu-
roinvasive disease develops in <1% (6,7). On the basis of
reported neuroinvasive cases and an estimated ratio of the
number of infections to neuroinvasive cases, as of October
2004, a total of ≈1 million persons have been infected with
WNV in the United States (2).
Evidence accumulated in 2002 that WNV could be
transmitted by blood transfusion, culminating in 23 docu-
mented cases that year (8–10). In late 2002, the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), US blood collection
organizations, and test manufacturers began an accelerated
program to implement nucleic acid amplification testing
(NAT) of blood donors for West Nile viremia before the
2003 season (11,12). Assays were developed for use in a
minipool-NAT format (i.e., samples of donations are
pooled, and the pool is tested), similar to procedures now
routinely used for blood screening for HIV-1 and hepatitis
C virus (HCV) by NAT (13). In addition to minipool-NAT
screening, several blood centers performed individual
donation NAT screening in regions experiencing epidemic
WNV activity to interdict donations with low-level
viremia that could be missed by minipool-NAT (14–18).
Synthesis of blood donor screening data may provide
an opportunity for public health surveillance in addition to
ArboNET because of the large number of donations
screened from a broad cross-section of the adult popula-
tion. We report the combined results of WNV donor
screening during the summer and fall of 2003 by
America’s Blood Centers (ABC) and the American Red
Cross (ARC), which together collect and test ≈95% of US
donations. In addition, WNV IgM and IgG testing was per-
formed on donor specimens from 1 WNV-epidemic region
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Since July 2003, all blood donations have been
screened for WNV RNA by NAT. If we assume that blood
donation and WNV infection are independent events, the
proportion of blood donors infected by WNV in 2003 (sea-
sonal incidence of WNVin the blood donor pool) is a func-
tion of NATyield and the average length of time that WNV
RNA is detectable after infection. By measuring IgM anti-
bodies in North Dakota blood donors shortly after the epi-
demic, we estimated the seasonal incidence for that region.
After adding NAT screening yield data from the same
donor population, we then estimated the length of time that
WNV RNA is detectable by NAT. 
We combined the length of time that RNAis detectable
by NAT with NAT screening yield data by state to estimate
state-specific and national WNV seasonal incidence in the
blood donor and general population. Finally, by dividing
the estimated number of infections in the general popula-
tion in 2003 by the number of neuroinvasive disease cases
reported to the national WNV surveillance system
(ArboNET), we estimated the ratio of WNV infections to
neuroinvasive disease cases.
Blood Donor Screening
US blood donations are screened for WNV RNA by
using NAT assays on pools of 6 to 16 donations or on indi-
vidual samples in high-incidence regions. In 2003, ≈96%
of the screening was conducted on pooled samples.
Additionally, 2 blood collection organizations (ARC;
Blood Systems) retrospectively performed individual
donation NAT on cryopreserved plasma from 36,269 dona-
tions in 5 states with substantial epidemics to ascertain the
proportion of low-level viremia missed by minipool-NAT
and to assess, through recipient lookback, the infectivity of
units harboring low-level viremia (15,16). Viremic dona-
tions detected by individual donation NAT were included
in this analysis to compile total NAT yield for 2003, but
they were excluded from calculations used to project
WNV infection in the general population for the following
reasons: 1) inconsistent application of individual donation
NAT screening around the country (15,16); 2) variable rate
of detection of low-level viremia by individual donation
NAT assays (18); and 3) fever and symptoms during the
postseroconversion low-level viremia phase (unlike the
asymptomatic minipool yield phase), which would result
in self-deferral from donation and bias our projections.
West Nile Viremia in US Blood Donors: 
Geographic and Temporal Distribution
We combined 2 large databases consisting of all dona-
tions and WNV-confirmed donations obtained by state
from July 1 (when most blood centers implemented WNV
NAT screening) to October 31, 2003. The first database
was derived from 72 of the 74 independent blood centers
that constitute ABC, which collect nearly 50% of US dona-
tions (14,19). Data elements included total number of
donations, donor state of residence, and the minipool and
individual donation NAT confirmatory status of all dona-
tions collected from July to October 2003. Similar data
were obtained from the ARC national donor database,
which constitutes 45% of the US supply (16). Donations
were classified as confirmed WNV NAT-positive if the
index donation was reactive by NAT and 1) positive for
IgM or by an alternative NAT procedure or 2) follow-up
samples from donors were reactive on a NAT assay or were
IgM-positive. The dataset included the subset of confirmed
NAT-positive donations that were either originally detected
by minipool-NAT, or had been detected by prospective
individual donation NAT but were subsequently deter-
mined to be detectable by minipool-NAT (were reactive
when retested at a 1:16 dilution using minipool-NAT). This
extra testing ensured that seasonal incidence estimates
were based on data obtained by using a comparably sensi-
tive screening process across all regions of the United
States and throughout the epidemic period. The proportion
of confirmed positive donations identified by minipool-
NAT was determined by month for each state, and ≈95%
confidence intervals (CIs) around these minipool-NAT
yield estimates were computed (20). The Epi Map compo-
nent (Environmental Systems Research Institute, Redlands,
CA, USA) of EpiInfo version 3.3 (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention [CDC], Atlanta, GA, USA) was
used to display results graphically.
Estimate of Days West Nile Viremia Is 
Detectable by Minipool-NAT
To use NAT screening data to estimate state-specific
WNV seasonal incidences, we first derived an estimate for
the average length of time that RNA is detectable by
minipool-NAT after infection occurs (TMP-NAT). TMP-
NAT can be approximated if both the minipool-NAT
screening yield and seasonal incidence of WNV are known
(Appendices 1 and 2; available from http://www.bsrisf.org/
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app2.html). The seasonal incidence was estimated by
measuring the peak WNV IgM prevalence observed in a
particular region ≈3 weeks after the end of the region’s
first epidemic (http://www. bsrisf.org/eid2006/app1.html).
Serologic data allowed us to evaluate both minipool-NAT
yield and prevalence of IgM for each week from July to
September 2003 and to identify peak IgM prevalence. The
sum of the weekly minipool-NAT yield estimates divided
by the peak IgM prevalence (our estimate of the 2003 sea-
sonal incidence in North Dakota) was used to derive TMP-
NAT (http://www.bsrisf.org/eid2006/app2.html). Approx-
imate 95% CIs around peak IgM prevalence and TMP-
NAT were calculated by assuming normal distributions
with variances approximated by Taylor series (21).
WNV Seasonal Incidence 
We assumed that WNV infection dynamics are similar
in blood donors and in the general population. The month-
ly WNV incidence in each state for each month from July
through October was derived by multiplying the monthly
minipool-NAT yield by the number of days in each month
and dividing by the average period of time during which
RNA is detectable (TMP-NAT) (Appendix 3; available
from http://www.bsrisf.org/eid2006/app3.html). Each
state-specific seasonal WNV incidence was calculated by
summing the 4 monthly WNVincidence estimates. To esti-
mate 2003 WNV infections nationwide, we multiplied
each state-specific seasonal WNV incidence by the corre-
sponding July 1, 2003, population estimate from the US
Census Bureau (22) and then summed over all states. An
≈95% CI around the estimated 2003 WNV infections
nationwide was calculated by assuming a normal distribu-
tion with variance approximated by Taylor series (21).
Proportion of West Nile Infections Resulting in
Neuroinvasive Disease 
We then calculated the ratio of the estimated number of
WNV infections nationwide and the total neuroinvasive
disease cases reported to CDC (23). The standard error
(SE) of this ratio is dependent on the SE of the total neu-
roinvasive disease cases (assumed to be Poisson distrib-
uted), the SE of TMP-NAT, and the SEs of state-specific
minipool-NAT yield estimates (assumed to be binomially
distributed) and was approximated by a Taylor series (21).
We did not estimate the proportion of infections resulting
in West Nile–related febrile illness because it is consider-
ably underreported to ArboNET.
Approvals for Research on Human Subjects
The Investigational New Drug protocols, which includ-
ed donor consent for WNV NAT screening and follow-up
testing, were reviewed and approved by multiple institu-
tional review boards and FDA. Institutional review board
approval of this study protocol, including compilation of a
national NAT yield database and anonymous IgM and IgG
testing (http://www.bsrisf.org/eid2006/app1. html), was
obtained from the University of California, San Francisco
Committee for Human Research, and from Westat
(Rockville, MD, USA).
Results
Overall, 944 confirmed West Nile viremic donors
(0.02%) were identified by NAT screening among
4,585,573 donations from July 1 to October 31, 2003, at
ARC and participating centers in ABC. These included
770 donations detected by minipool-NAT and 174 dona-
tions detected only as a result of prospective or retrospec-
tive individual donation NAT. The distribution of
minipool-NAT and individual donation NAT yield by
month is shown in Figure 1. Of the 191 viremic donations
detected in July, only 2 were detected in the first week of
July (both on July 6), and only 4 confirmed viremic dona-
tions were reported by ABC or ARC after October 31;
thus, the July–October period composes virtually the entire
2003 epidemic. Geographically, the epidemic was most
dramatic in the Central Plains states. The rate of WNV-
infected donations exceeded 3 per 1,000 in Colorado in
July and August and in 4 additional contiguous states in
August (Figure 2).
North Dakota Data
As shown in Figure 3, minipool-NAT–confirmed posi-
tive donations were detected from July 13 to September 6,
2003, in the Bismarck and Minot regions of North Dakota,
with minipool-NAT yield peaking at 1.4% (95% CI
0.4–2.3) in late August. IgM-confirmed positive donations
were not observed in these same regions during the first 3
West Nile Virus Infections, United States, 2003
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Figure 1. Yield of West Nile virus nucleic acid amplification test
(NAT) screening of 4,585,573 donations at American Red Cross
and America’s Blood Centers (constituting ≈95% of US collections)
from July 1 to October 31, 2003. A total of 944 confirmed viremic
donations were identified, including 770 that were detectable by
minipool-NAT and 174 detectable only by individual donation NAT.
MP, minipool; ID, individual donation.weeks of July but were detected toward the end of July.
IgM prevalence gradually increased thereafter and reached
a plateau around September 7; ≈5% of donations were pos-
itive for IgM during most of September. The peak IgM
prevalence was observed the last week of September
(5.2%, 95% CI 3.0–7.4) and was similar to the IgG preva-
lence observed 9 months later in June 2004 (5.3%, 95% CI
3.9%–6.7%), when IgM prevalence had declined to 1.2%.
Thus, the peak IgM weekly prevalence was assumed to be
a good estimate of the seasonal incidence in this region.
The average length of time viremia is detectable by
minipool-NAT, TMP-NAT, was estimated to be 6.9 days
(95% CI 3.0–10.7).
WNV Seasonal Incidence
The proportion of the population estimated to have
become infected during 2003 in each state was 0%–4.9%
(Figure 4A and Table). The highest proportions were
observed in Nebraska (4.9%), Colorado (4.3%), North
Dakota (4.1%), South Dakota (4.0%), Wyoming (3.5%),
and Kansas (2.1%). Nationally, 735,000 persons (95% CI
322,000–1,147,000) were estimated to have been infected
in 2003 (Table). Figure 4B shows the distribution of these
infections by state. The greatest number of infections were
located in Colorado, Texas, Nebraska, Kansas, the
Dakotas, and to a lesser extent the states in the Midwest
and Northeast, which had only moderate seasonal inci-
dence but have large populations.
Reported WNV Neuroinvasive Disease Relative to
Projected Infection Incidence
We compared the estimated proportion of the popula-
tion infected with WNV to the proportion of WNV neu-
roinvasive disease cases reported to CDC for each state.
Figure 5 shows that these proportions are highly correlat-
ed with one another. A total of 2,866 neuroinvasive WNV
cases were reported nationally to CDC’s ArboNET system
in 2003 (Table). This total was compared to 735,000 per-
sons nationally estimated to have been infected with WNV
in 2003. Thus, an estimated 256 WNV incident infections
occurred per reported neuroinvasive disease case (95% CI
112–401). An estimate of 353 infections per each reported
neuroinvasive disease case (95% CI 190–516) was
obtained by analyzing the North Dakota data separately,
which had 94 reported neuroinvasive cases among an esti-
mated 33,000 infections (5.2% peak IgM prevalence × the
state population of 633,837).
Sensitivity Analyses
Two potential biases may have affected our estimated
ratio of 256 WNVincident infections per reported neuroin-
vasive disease case. First, neuroinvasive cases may be
underreported to ArboNET. A 20% underreporting of neu-
roinvasive cases to ArboNET alters the ratio to 205 WNV
RESEARCH
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Figure 2. Yield of minipool–
nucleic acid testing of blood
donors for West Nile virus RNA
by state and month, 2003.
Figure 3. West Nile virus minipool—nucleic acid amplification test-
ing (MP-NAT) yield and immunoglobulin M (IgM) and IgG sero-
prevalence estimates for North Dakota, during and ≈8 months
after the 2003 epidemic period. incident infections per reported neuroinvasive disease case
(95% CI 90–320). Second, blood donors may underrepre-
sent infections in the general population because prospec-
tive donors who are WNV-infected may self-defer or be
deferred from donating. If the number of infections in the
general population was underestimated by 20%, the ratio
of WNV incident infections per reported neuroinvasive
disease case would be 320 (95% CI 140–501).
Discussion
This project, which collected and analyzed WNV
screening data for 95% of US blood donations during the
2003 epidemic, identified 944 viremic donations among
4.6 million donations screened from July 1 to October 31.
The number of viremic donors identified in 2003 is a slight
underestimate since viremic donors identified by partici-
pating ABC and ARC centers outside the study time frame
and viremic donors identified at nonparticipating collec-
tion centers and the military blood program were not
included. The ABC and ARC data indicate that ≈1,000
West Nile viremic donors were identified in the United
States in 2003 by prospective NAT screening, and conse-
quently  ≈1,500 potentially infectious blood components
were interdicted before transfusion (24). This yield is par-
ticularly remarkable when compared with NAT screening
for HIV-1 and HCV, which identified only 12 HIV and 170
HCV-infected antibody-negative donations among ≈39
million donations screened in the first 4 years of testing
(13). 
One goal of this project was to monitor the geographic
and temporal distribution of WNV in the US blood donor
population. We documented rates of viremic blood donors
exceeding 3 per 1,000 donations in some states during the
peak of the 2003 epidemic. The proportion of confirmed
positive donations identified by minipool-NAT paralleled
the neuroinvasive case reports in each state. Blood donor
NAT screening data are useful for population surveillance
because the testing has a rapid turnaround time, infections
are identified soon after WNV acquisition, many of these
infections remain asymptomatic, and typically those in
whom symptoms develop are identified before illness
onset. Communication of WNV donor screening data from
blood centers to state and county health departments thus
augments national surveillance and facilitates more com-
plete national reporting of human WNV infections to
CDC’s ArboNET program (24).
Our estimate of an average 6.9-day period of viremia
detectable by minipool-NAT correlates well with the dura-
tion of viremia that was documented after intentional
WNV inoculation of human cancer patients in the 1950s
(25). In those studies, the duration of viremia (detected by
intracerebral inoculation in mice, which is less sensitive
than minipool-NAT) correlated with underlying disease
severity and averaged 6.2 days in a subset of relatively
healthy patients. 
Our results have limitations. We assumed that WNV
incidence in blood donors reflects incidence in the general
population. Blood donors differ from the general popula-
tion with respect to age; however, serologic surveys indi-
cate that age is not associated with the likelihood of WNV
infection acquisition but is associated with severity of dis-
ease (1,2,6,7). Some racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
groups are also underrepresented in the blood donor popu-
lation. Because WNV is a mosquitoborne arbovirus, inci-
dence may vary among these demographic subgroups,
which could bias extrapolations based on donor data.
Moreover, potential donors with fever or headache are
deferred from donation because the combined symptoms
may indicate WNV infection; thus, blood donor screening
data would underestimate infection incidence in the gener-
al population. However, we believe an underestimate is
unlikely since the primary viremia phase of infection
detected by minipool-NAT tends to precede development
of WNV-related symptoms (1,10,26).
Although projections of seasonal incidence estimates
based on donor data have limitations, they represent a
source of data independent from national disease report-
ing. Completeness of reporting of WNV neuroinvasive
cases to ArboNET is unknown and likely varies among
states. The ratio of total infections to neuroinvasive cases
is also not precisely known, thus adding uncertainty to
incidence data extrapolated from such cases. Using blood
donor screening data, we project that ≈256 people are
infected with WNV for each person in whom neuroinva-
West Nile Virus Infections, United States, 2003
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 3, March 2006 399
Figure 4. A) Projected number of West Nile virus (WNV) infections
per 1,000 persons. B) Estimated total number of WNV infections
per state during 2003 epidemic season. RESEARCH
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ilar to that observed in a serologic survey in Romania,
which estimated that 1 in 140–320 infections results in
neuroinvasive disease (6). Previous estimates of the total
number of persons infected in the United States are based
on a serologic survey in New York City that indicated that
1 in 140 infections (95% CI 61–217) results in neuroinva-
sive disease (2,7). Although CIs around the New York City
estimate and our ratio overlap, the blood donor screening
data suggest that previous projections may have underesti-
mated the total number of persons infected. Similar analy-
ses to determine the proportion of infections that result in
febrile illness or other clinical manifestation of WNV
would be of interest. However, reporting of these illnesses
to ArboNet is incomplete and highly variable by state and
over time and hence not appropriate for this purpose.
Follow-up studies of viremic donors have demonstrated
that febrile syndromes develop in 20% to 30% of patients
(26), consistent with reports from other studies (1–3).
Our approach of using NAT yield data to project WNV
infections has advantages over serologic strategies.
Performing large-scale, community-based serologic sur-
veys to estimate infection incidence is prohibitively expen-
sive, is subject to participation bias, and can be biased by
previous exposures to WNV or infections by other fla-
viviruses that cross-react on WNV IgM and IgG assays
(9,27–31). Given the extent of recent WNV spread in the
United States, interpretation of future serologic surveys
will require determination of baseline prevalence before
each epidemic year, evaluation of serial samples through-
out the epidemic to accurately estimate infection inci-
dence, or both. 
In conclusion, our study demonstrates that in addition
to preventing many transfusion-transmitted WNV infec-
tions, routine donor NAT screening has valuable public
health applications, both as an early indicator of human
epidemic activity regionally and as a surveillance tool to
help monitor national infection incidence. In addition, this
study highlights the value of establishing a national system
for compiling blood donor data, which would enable ongo-
ing and timely surveillance of WNV and other established
and emerging infectious diseases.
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